We present a simple strongly universal innocent game model for Levy-Longo trees i.e. every point in the model is the denotation of a unique Levy-Longo tree. The observational quotient of the model then gives a universal, and hence fully abstract, model of the pure Lazy Lambda Calculus.
Introduction
This paper presents a strongly universal innocent game model for Levy-Longo trees [Lev75, Lon83] (i.e. every point in the model is the denotation of a unique Levy-Longo tree). We consider arenas in the sense of [HO00, McC98] in which questions may justify either questions or answers, but answers may only justify questions; and we say that an answer (respectively question) is pending in a justified sequence if no question (respectively answer) is explicitly justified by it. Plays are justified sequences that satisfy the standard conditions of Visibility and Well-Bracketing, and a new condition, which is a kind of dual of Well-Bracketing, called Persistence: Every question is explicitly justified by the last pending answer, provided a pending answer exists at that point; otherwise it is explicitly justified by a question.
We then consider conditionally copycat strategies, which are innocent strategies (in the sense of [HO00] ) that behave in a copycat fashion as soon as an Oanswer is followed by a P-answer. Together with a condition called Relevance, we prove that the recursive such strategies give a strongly universal model of Levy-Longo trees i.e. every strategy is the denotation of a unique LevyLongo tree. To our knowledge, this is the first universal model of Levy-Longo trees. The observational quotient of the model then gives a universal and fully abstract model of the pure Lazy Lambda Calculus [Plo75, AO93] .
Related work
Universal (game) models for the Lazy Lambda Calculus with convergence test were first presented in [AM95] and [McC96] . The model studied in the former is in the AJM style [AJM00] , while that in the latter, by McCusker, is based on an innocent-strategy [HO00] universal model for call-by-name FPC, and is obtained via a universal and fully abstract translation from the Lazy Lambda Calculus into call-by-name FPC. The present paper considers the pure (i.e. without any constant) Lazy Lambda Calculus. Our model builds on what is essentially McCusker's model by adding three constraints: Persistence, which is a constraint on plays, and Conditional Copycat and Relevance, which are constraints on strategies. Indeed ours is a submodel of McCusker's (see Remark 12).
The first fully abstract (game) model of the the pure Lazy Lambda Calculus was constructed by the second author in [Gia01] . The strategies therein are history-free and satisfy a monotonicity condition. The model is not universal (there are finite monotone strategies that are not denotable). However we believe it is possible to achieve universality by introducing a condition similar to Relevance. In [KNO02, KNO99] game models based on effectively almosteverywhere copycat (or EAC) strategies are constructed which are strongly universal for Nakajima trees and Böhm trees respectively. Several local structure results for AJM-style game models can be found in [GFH99] .
Arenas, legal positions and nested levels
We begin this section by introducing a formal setting for playing games called arenas. Legal positions are then introduced as justified sequences (which are sequences of moves with pointers) that satisfy three conditions, namely, Visibility, Well-Bracketing and Persistence. The second part of the section is about nested levels of sequences of questions and answers, a notion useful for several technical proofs in the sequel.
Arenas and legal positions
An arena is a triple A = M A , λ A , ⊢ A where M A is a set of moves; λ A : M A −→ { PQ, PA, OQ, OA } is a labelling function that indicates whether a given move is a P-move or an O-move, and whether it is a question (Q) or an answer (A); and ⊢ A ⊆ (M A + { * }) × M A (where * is a dummy move), called justification relation (we read m 1 ⊢ A m 2 as "m 1 justifies m 2 "), satisfies the following axioms: for m, m ′ , m i ranging over M A
(1) For each m ∈ M A , there is a unique m − ∈ M A +{ * } such that m − ⊢ A m; in case * ⊢ A m, we call m initial. It is useful to think of the justification relation ⊢ A (restricted to M A × M A ) as defining the edge-set of a vertex-labelled directed graph whose vertex-set is M A . We shall refer to the graph as the arena graph of A.
We use square and round parentheses in bold type as meta-variables for moves as follows:
for the set of initial moves of A, and write (−) for the function that inverts the P/O-designation of a move, so that e.g. PQ = OQ and OA = PA etc.
The simplest arena is the empty arena 1 = ∅, ∅, ∅ . Let A and B be arenas. The product arena A × B is just the disjoint union of the arena graphs of A and B. Formally we have
Given an arena A, we write A for the graph that is obtained from the arena graph of A by inverting the P/O-label at each vertex. As an operation on arena graphs, the function space arena A ⇒ B is obtained from the arena graph of B by grafting a copy of A just under each initial move b of B (so that each tree of A is a subtree of b). Formally we have
and ⊢ A⇒B is defined by:
Note that we shall refer to a move of the form (a, b) ∈ M A⇒B simply as a copy of a.
The lifted arena A ⊥ is obtained from A by adding two moves, namely, q, which is the new initial move, and a, which is a P-answer, such that q justifies a which justifies each initial move of A, and moves from A inherit the relation ⊢ A .
A justified sequence over an arena A is a finite sequence of alternating moves such that, except the first move which is initial, every move m has a justification pointer (or simply pointer ) to some earlier move m − satisfying m − ⊢ A m; we say that m is explicitly justified by m − . A question (respectively answer) in a justified sequence s is said to be pending just in case no answer (respectively question) in s is explicitly justified by it. This extends the standard meaning of "pending questions" to "pending answers". Recall the definition of the P-view s of a justified sequence s: Definition 1 A justified sequence s over A is said to be a legal position (or play) just in case it satisfies:
(1) Visibility: Every P-move (respectively non-initial O-move) is explicitly justified by some move that appears in the P-view (respectively O-view) at that point. (2) Well-Bracketing: Every answer is explicitly justified by the last pending question at that point. (3) Persistence: Every question is explicitly justified by the last pending answer, provided there is one such at that point, otherwise it is explicitly justified by a question.
For example in the following justified sequence
Persistence requires that the last move "(" be explicitly justified by ")". For another example, take the following justified sequence that satisfies Persistence:
The last "(" must be explicitly justified by one of the two "["; it may not be explicitly justified by ")".
Remark 2 (i) Except for Persistence, all that we have introduced so far are standard notions of the innocent approach to Game Semantics in the sense of [HO00] . Note that there can be at most one pending O-answer (respectively P-answer) in a P-view (respectively O-view). It is an immediate consequence of Well-Bracketing that no question may be answered more than once in a legal position.
(ii) It is a consequence of the definition that in an odd-length (respectively even-length) legal position, the last pending question (if any) is an O-question (respectively P-question), and the last pending answer (if any) is an O-answer (respectively P-answer).
(iii) As a consequence of Persistence, if a question in a legal position is explicitly justified by an answer, the answer must be pending at that point.
Persistence may be regarded as a dual of Well-Bracketing: it is to questions what Well-Bracketing is to answers. The effect of Persistence is that, whenever there is a pending O-answer, a strategy is restricted in which question it can ask, or equivalently over which argument it can interrogate, at that point (of course it may decide to answer an O-question instead). An apparently similar restriction on the behaviour of strategies is captured by the rigidity condition introduced by Danos and Harmer [DH01] , namely, for any legal position of a rigid strategy, the pointer from a question is to some move that appears in the R-view of the play at that point. However since Persistence is a constraint on plays consisting of answers that may justify questions, whereas rigidity is a condition on strategies over arenas whose answers do not justify any move, it is not immediately obvious how the two notions are related.
Nested levels
Take any set M that is equipped with a function λ : M −→ { Q, A } which labels elements as either questions or answers. Let s be a finite sequence of elements from M -call s a dialogue. The nested level of a dialogue is closely related to the number of pending questions at that point. Formally, set # qn (s) and # ans (s) respectively to be the number of questions and the number of answers in s; following [Gia01], we define the nested level at s m (or simply the level of m whenever s is understood) to be
we define NL(ǫ) = 0. Take, for example, the dialogue
We present the same sequence by displaying the elements at their respective levels as follows:
For l ≥ 0, we write s ↾ l to mean the subsequence of s consisting of moves at level l.
We state some basic properties of nested levels of dialogues.
Lemma 3 In the following, we let s range over dialogues.
(i) For any s = u m m ′ , if m and m ′ are at different levels l and l ′ respectively, then m and m ′ are either both questions (in which case l ′ = l + 1) or both answers (in which case l ′ = l − 1). As a corollary we have: (i') If a and b in a dialogue are at levels l 1 and l 2 respectively, then for any l 1 ≤ l ≤ l 2 , there is some move between a and b (inclusive) at level l. (ii) For any l ≥ 0, if l < NL(s) (respectively l > NL(s)) then the last move in s at level l, if it exists, is a question (respectively answer). (iii) Suppose s begins with a question. For each l, if s ↾ l is non-empty, the first element is a question, thereafter the elements alternate strictly between answers and questions.
PROOF. (i): By a straightforward question-answer case analysis of m and m ′ .
(ii): Take an m which is the last in s at level l < NL(s). The element m ′ (say) after m in s is at a level not equal to l, which must be l + 1; for if it were l − 1, by (i'), there must be some move after m ′ at level l, which contradicts the assumption that m is the last such. The required result then follows from (i). The other case is symmetrical.
(iii): We prove by induction on the length |s| of s. The base case of |s| = 0 is trivial. For the inductive case, take sm such that NL(s) = l and NL(sm) = l+1; by (i) above, m is a question. Suppose s ↾ (l + 1) is non-empty, the last move m ′ (say) by (ii) must be an answer. We leave the other cases of NL(sm) = l and l − 1 to the reader as an easy exercise.
We shall see shortly that the notion of nested level is useful for proving the compositionality of strategies. Note that Lemma 3 holds for dialogues in general -there is no assumption of justification relation or pointers, nor of the distinction between P and O.
Before we conclude the section, we prove another result about nested levels. Unlike the first, this result concerns dialogues that are equipped with justification pointers. First we introduce anonymous arenas which are arenas except that the moves are not designated as either P-moves or O-moves. Formally an anonymous arena is a structure M, λ, ⊢ such that M is a set, λ : M −→ { Q, A } is a map that labels each element of M as either a question (Q) or an answer (A), and ⊢ ⊆ (M + { * }) × M is a relation that satisfies axioms (1) and (4) of justification relations, and (2'): Every initial move is a question. Note that an anonymous arena is just an arena graph except that its vertices are labelled by either Q or A.
A dialogue with pointers over an anonymous arena M, λ, ⊢ is a finite sequence of elements of M in which each element m, except the first which is initial, is equipped with a pointer to some earlier element m − in the sequence such that m − ⊢ m. The prime examples of dialogues with pointers are legal positions and interaction sequences (which we shall introduce in the following section). Note that it is clear what it means for a question (or an answer) in a dialogue with pointers to be pending; note also that as conditions for dialogues with pointers, Well-Bracketing and Persistence are well-defined. PROOF. We prove both parts by induction on the length |s| of s. The base case of |s| = 0 is trivial. For the inductive case, we reason by cases. Take s = u q and suppose q and m are question moves. By the induction hypothesis and by Lemma 3(i'), the last pending answer in u q, if it exists, is the last move a in u q at level NL(u q) + 1. Since by Persistence m is explicitly justified by a and since NL(u q m) = NL(u q) + 1, it follows that (i) and (ii) hold. All the remaining cases, i.e. when one or both the moves m and q are answer moves, can be proved in a similar, or simpler, way.
Conditionally copycat strategies and relevance
This section introduces a Cartesian closed category L whose objects are arenas and whose maps are innocent strategies that satisfy two new conditions: Conditionally Copycat and Relevance.
Innocence and conditionally copycat
Recall that a P-strategy (or simply strategy) σ for a game A is defined to be a non-empty, prefix-closed set of legal positions of A satisfying:
(1) For any even-length s ∈ σ, if sm is a legal position then sm ∈ σ.
(2) (Determinacy). For any odd-length s, if sm and sm
A strategy is said to be innocent [HO00] if whenever even-length s m ∈ σ then for any odd-length s ′ ∈ σ such that s = s ′ , we have s ′ m ∈ σ. That is to say, σ is completely determined by a partial function f (say), which maps P-views p to justified P-moves (i.e. f (p) is a P-move together with a pointer to some move in p). We write f σ for the minimal such function that defines σ. We say that an innocent strategy σ is compact just in case f σ is a finite function (or equivalently σ contains only finitely many even-length P-views).
Definition 5 We say that an innocent strategy σ is conditionally copycat (or simply CC) if for any odd-length P-view p ∈ σ in which there is an Oanswer which is immediately followed by a P-answer (i.e. p has the shape "· · · ) ] · · ·"), then p m ∈ σ for some P-move m which is explicitly justified by the penultimate O-move in p.
CC strategies can be characterized as follows.
Lemma 6 (CC) An innocent strategy σ is CC if and only if for every evenlength P-view p in σ that has the shape u ) 0 ] 0 v (1) for any O-move m, if pm ∈ σ then pmm ′ ∈ σ for some P-move m ′ , and (2) the sequence ) 0 ] 0 v is a copycat block of moves, i.e. it has the form a 0 b 0 a 1 b 1 · · · a n b n and (a) for each i ≤ n, the P-move b i is a question iff the preceding O-move a i is a question (b) for each i < n, b i explicitly justifies a i+1 (and does so uniquely), and each a i explicitly justifies b i+1 (and does so uniquely). In other words ) 0 ] 0 v is an interleaving of two sequences v 1 and v 2 , such that in each v i , each element (except the first) is explicitly justified by the preceding element in the other sequence.
PROOF. The ⇐-direction is straightforward. We prove the other direction. We omit the proof of (1) as it is obvious. Since p is a P-view, a n+1 must be justified by b n . By CC, b n+1 must be justified by a n . It follows that (2b) holds.
We prove (2a) by induction on the length |v| of v. The base case of |v| = 0 is obvious. Now take any even-length P-view p where the corresponding v has length 2n + 2. We shall consider all possible cases.
If a n is an answer, by the induction hypothesis so is b n , and since an answer can only justify a question, a n+1 must be an O-question; and b n+1 must be a P-question because of Well-Bracketing.
If a n is a question, by the induction hypothesis so is b n , now if a n+1 is a question then so is b n+1 because of Well-Bracketing; on the other hand, if a n+1 is an answer then so is b n+1 because of Persistence.
The three cases considered are as follows:
Composition of strategies
For arenas A 1 , A 2 and A 3 , a local sequence over (A 1 , A 2 , A 3 ) is a sequence u of elements from the set M A 1 + M A 2 + M A 3 such that every element m in u other than the first (which must be initial in A 3 ) has a pointer to some earlier element m − satisfying:
We write L(A 1 , A 2 , A 3 ) for the set of local sequences over (A 1 , A 2 , A 3 ). Now suppose σ and τ are strategies over arenas A ⇒ B and B ⇒ C respectively. The set of interaction sequences arising from σ and τ , written ISeq(σ, τ ), consists of local sequences u ∈ L(A, B, C) such that
is the subsequence of u consisting of moves from the arena A ⇒ B that are hereditarily justified by the occurrence b (note that the subsequence inherits the pointers associated with the moves); similarly u ↾ (B, C), called the (B, C)-component of u, is the subsequence of u consisting of moves from the arena B ⇒ C. We can now define the composite strategy σ ; τ over A ⇒ C:
In u ↾ (A, C) the pointer of every initial A-move is to the unique initial Cmove.
It is straightforward to verify that an interaction sequence u ∈ ISeq(σ, τ ) is a dialogue with pointers over the anonymous arena M, λ, ⊢ where
As is the case with moves of function space arenas, we shall refer to a move of the form ((a, b), c) (say) simply as a copy of a.) Thus the nested level of an interaction sequence is well-defined. We say that two moves in u ∈ ISeq(σ, τ ) are from the same subarena if both are from A, or both are from B, or both are from C.
Lemma 7 Let σ and τ be as before. Take any u ∈ ISeq(σ, τ ). (ii) By induction on the length |u| of u. The base case of |u| = 0 is trivial. For the inductive case, let u = v m. There are two subcases according to whether m is a question or an answer. We shall just consider the former since the latter is similar. If there is no pending answer in v then there is also no pending answer in the component v ↾ θ to which m belongs. Thus, by Persistence, m is justified by a question, and so, Persistence is satisfied by m in u. Otherwise if there are pending answers in v, let a be the last such. If a and m both belong to the same component θ, the thesis follows immediately from (i): a is the last pending answer in v ↾ θ, and, by Persistence of justified sequences in σ and τ , m is explicitly justified by a.
We now prove that it is impossible for a and m to belong to different components. Let a ′ be the move following a and let m ′ be the move preceding m. Then a ′ must be an answer (for if not a would not be pending) and m ′ must be a question (for if not a would be equal to m ′ ). By the induction hypothesis, we can apply Lemma 4(i) to v, and so, by Lemma 3(i'
Notation. We write s m for the prefix of s that terminates at m; and write s <m for the prefix of s that terminates at the move just before m.
We are now in a position to prove that the composition of (innocent) strategies is well-defined and preserves Conditionally Copycat (CC).
Lemma 8 Suppose σ and τ are strategies over arenas A ⇒ B and B ⇒ C respectively.
(i) The composite σ ; τ is a well-defined strategy over A ⇒ C.
(ii) If σ and τ are CC innocent, so is σ ; τ .
PROOF. (i):
We need to show that the elements in σ ; τ , which are justified sequences over A ⇒ C (see e.g. [HO00] for a proof), satisfy the three axioms of legal positions. The argument for the first can be found in [HO00] . For Persistence, take a justified sequence s q = u q ↾ (A, C) from σ ; τ where q is a question. If there is a pending answer in s, it follows from Lemma 7(i) that there is also a pending answer in u. Since u q satisfies Persistence (thanks to Lemma 7(ii)), q is explicitly justified by the last pending answer a (say) in u, and by Lemma 7(i) a is also the last pending answer in s. Moreover, suppose q is justified in s by an answer a; we need to prove that a is pending in s. Now 1 Switching Convention: if m 1 m 2 are consecutive moves in a legal position of A ⇒ B such that one is an A-move and the other a B-move, then m 2 is a P-move. I.e. only P is allowed to switch games.
(by the definition of function space arena) it follows that q is justified in u by the same answer a. Since u satisfies Persistence, a is pending in u, and so, by Lemma 7(i), a is also pending in s.
(ii): Suppose σ and τ are CC innocent strategies. We show that the composite is CC. (For a proof that the composite is innocent, see e.g. [HO00] .) By the characterization of CC in Lemma 6, it suffices to prove that even-length Pviews in σ ; τ of the form p 0 ) 0 ] 0 v, where |v| ≥ 1, satisfy the condition given in the Lemma. We shall only give the proof for the case of |v| = 2 (since the inductive case is a tedious repetition of the same argument):
If the odd-length P-view
0 is a C-move. There are two cases: either ] 0 is a C-move or it is an A-move. We shall consider the latter, since it is harder. Suppose ) 0 and ] 0 are at levels l ′ and l in u respectively. By Lemma 3(ii), we have l ′ > l. Set l 0 = l ′ − l which is even. By Lemma 3(i'), for each 1 ≤ k < l 0 , there is a move, which must be a B-move, occurring between ) 0 and ] 0 in u at level l + k, and by Lemma 3(ii) the last such at that level is an answer.
Claim. The block of B-moves b 1 · · · b L between ) 0 and ] 0 consists of one move (which must be an answer) per level, starting from l + l 0 − 1 and going down to l + 1. I.e. L = l 0 − 1, and for each 1 ≤ k ≤ l 0 − 1, b k is an answer at level l + l 0 − k.
We prove the claim by contradiction. Suppose b 1 , b 2 · · · , b k respectively are answers at levels l + l 0 − 1, · · · , l + l 0 − k but b k+1 is a question, which must be at the same level as b k . Suppose b k−1 and b k are both from the component (say) (A, B, b) for some occurrence b of an initial B-move, b k−1 is an O-answer and b k is a P-answer in u ↾ (A, B, b) . By Lemma 4(ii), b k+1 is an O-question explicitly justified by b k ; since σ is assumed to be CC, b k+2 is a P-question explicitly justified by b k−1 at level l + l 0 − k − 1. Now continuing in this fashion, and by appealing to the assumption that σ and τ are CC, we have
, where for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the Bquestion b 2k−i+1 is explicitly justified by the answer b i , and c is a C-question explicitly justified by ) 0 , which is a contradiction.
By assumption, [ 1 is explicitly justified by ] 0 , and so, it is an A-move. It suffices to prove that
( 1 is a C-move which is at the same level as, and so is explicitly justified by, ) 0 , and for each 1 ≤ i ≤ l 0 −1, d i is a B-question at level l+i which is explicitly justified by the B-answer b l 0 −i . We leave this as a straightforward exercise for the reader.
A notion of relevance
We consider a notion of Relevance whereby P is not allowed to respond to an O-question by engaging O indefinitely in a dialogue at one level higher, nor is P allowed to "give up"; instead he must answer the O-question eventually.
Definition 9
We say that a CC strategy σ is relevant if (1) for each P-view p ) ∈ σ, there is a P-move m such that p ) m ∈ σ (2) there is no infinite sequence p ( 0 ) 0 ( 1 ) 1 · · · such that for every n
Theorem 10 If σ and τ are relevant CC strategies over arenas A ⇒ B and B ⇒ C respectively then the composite σ ; τ is also a relevant CC strategy.
PROOF. Thanks to Lemma 8, it remains to prove that the composite σ ; τ satisfies conditions (1) and (2) of Relevance.
(1): Take a P-view p ) ∈ σ ; τ . Let u ∈ ISeq(σ, τ ) be the least sequence such that u ) ↾ (A, C) = p ). W.l.o.g. suppose ) is an O-move in the component (B, C) (it follows that ) is a C-move). Since τ is relevant and u ↾ (B, C) ) ∈ τ , there is a P-move m such that u ↾ (B, C) ) m ∈ τ . There are two cases: m is either a C-move or a B-move. If the former, p ) m ∈ σ ; τ (see e.g. the analysis of the composition of innocent strategies in [HO00]) and we are done. If the latter, let n be the largest such that u ) a 1 a 2 · · · a n ∈ ISeq(σ, τ ) and each a i is an answer. Note that n is a well-defined number (since the level of u ) a 1 a 2 · · · a i decreases as i increases, provided each a i is an answer) and at least one by assumption. Now if some a i is a move in A ⇒ C (and let i be the least such), we have p ) a i ∈ A ⇒ C are we are done. If not, by considering the P-view u ) a 1 a 2 · · · a n ↾ (B, C) in τ (w.l.o.g. assuming that a n is an O-move in the component (B, C)) which is relevant, we must have u ) a 1 a 2 · · · a n q n+1 ∈ ISeq(σ, τ ), for some question q n+1 which is explicitly justified by a n (by Persistence), and so, q n+1 is a B-move. Now since both σ and τ are CC, it follows inductively that there are B-questions q n+2 , · · · , q 2n such that u ) a 1 a 2 · · · a n q n+1 · · · q 2n ∈ ISeq(σ, τ ) and for each i ≥ 1, the question q n+i is explicitly justified by the answer a n−i+1 . Thus it follows that u ) a 1 a 2 · · · a n q n+1 · · · q 2n q ∈ ISeq(σ, τ ) for some question q which is explicitly justified by ), and so, q is a C-move and we are done.
(2): Suppose, for a contradiction, there is an infinite sequence (A, B, b) for some occurrence b of an initial B-move; it then follows that ) 0 , ( 1 , ) 1 , · · · are all A-moves (since they are all hereritarily justified by ( 0 ). By definition of composition, there is an infinite se- Thus, by first projecting to (A, B, b) and then taking the P-view, we have
for each n, which contradicts the assumption that σ is relevant.
The category L
We define a category called L whose objects are arenas and whose maps A −→ B are relevant CC strategies of the arena A ⇒ B. It is completely straightforward to verify that L is Cartesian closed (see e.g. [HO00] for a similar proof): the terminal object is the empty arena; for any arenas A and B, their Cartesian product is given by A × B, and the function space arena is A ⇒ B. However lifting (−) ⊥ is not functorial (see Remark 11). We write L rec for the subcategory whose objects are arenas but whose maps are recursive (in the sense of [HO00, §5.6]) relevant CC strategies.
Universality and full abstraction
We introduce an arena D, which is the initial solution of the recursive equation D = [D ⇒ D] ⊥ , and interpret (closed) λ-terms as relevant CC strategies over it. By an analysis of the structure of P-views over D, we obtain the main result of the paper: Every recursive relevant CC strategy over D is the denotation of a closed λ-term; further two terms have the same denotation iff they have the same Levy-Longo tree.
The model
Following [McC98] , for arenas A and B, we define the subarena relation A ¢ B by
Equipped with the ordering ¢, the collection of arenas is a (large) dcpo A, with least element the empty arena 1, and directed suprema given by taking component-wise union. Take any operation F on arenas. If F is monotone and continuous with respect to ¢, there is an arena solving the recursive equation
Let 
which is natural in C, where τ : C −→ t B denotes a convergent strategy in the sense that τ responds to the opening move immediately with an answer. As app is the inverse transpose of the identity map on [ 
where Γ = { x 1 , · · · , x n } is a finite set of variables including the free variables of s, by recursion over s as follows:
where π i is the standard projection map, and −, − is pairing. Standardly (see e.g. [AO93] ) this gives a model of the (Lazy) λ-calculus.
Remark 11 (i) There is no way lifting can be functorial in a category of arenas and conditionally copycat strategies. Take a CC strategy σ : A −→ B.
Since id ⊥ = id : A ⊥ −→ B ⊥ , σ ⊥ is forced to respond to the initial move q B in B ⊥ with the initial move q A in A ⊥ , and to respond to the P-view q B q A a A with the move a B . Now almost all P-views in σ ⊥ contain an O-answer a A immediately followed by a P-answer a B , and so, by Lemma 6, σ ⊥ is almost always constrained to play copycat, whereas σ may not be restricted in the same way. (It is easy to construct concrete instances of σ and σ ⊥ .)
(ii) Functoriality of lifting is not necessary for the construction of our model. Here we sketch a proof in stages (and explain what we mean by submodel) as follows:
(1) First we prove that the two models are defined over the same arena; an important difference is that D M contains plays in violation of Persistence. (2) We then define an embedding e of strategies in D to strategies in D M , and (3) prove that the embedding e preserves application.
By analogy with McCusker's category of games and innocent strategies, we define an L-game to be a pair consisting of an object of L (i.e. an arena) and the set of legal positions over it. We can now define a relation ◭ between L-games and the innocent games in the sense of [McC96] . We say that A ◭ A ′ just in case A and A ′ are defined over the same arena, A ′ contains all the plays in A, and A ′ does not contain any play in which there is (an occurrence of) an answer that justifies more that one question. It is straightforward to show that the relation ◭ is preserved by lifting and the functions space construction. As both models are appropriate limit constructions, it follows that D ◭ D M .
It is straightforward to check that Persistence is satisfied by every O-move that occurs in a P-view. Since an innocent strategy is completely determined by the set of P-views it contains, for any pair of games A and A ′ such that A ◭ A ′ , given a strategy σ over A, we define its embedding e A,A ′ (σ) to be the strategy over A ′ given by the set of P-view in σ. (To save writing, we shall omit the subscripts in e A,A ′ in the following.)
The composition of strategies depends on the set of plays in the strategies. Now the strategy e(σ) may contain plays that violate Persistence. We need to prove that e preserves the composition of strategies. That is to say, we need to prove that for every three pairs of games A, A ′ , B, B ′ , C and C ′ such that A ◭ A ′ , B ◭ B ′ and C ◭ C ′ , and for every pair of strategies σ : A ⇒ B and τ : B ⇒ C in L, the equality e(σ); e(τ ) = e(σ; τ ) holds. We shall establish e(σ); e(τ ) ⊆ e(σ; τ ) by regarding strategies as sets of P-views; the opposite inclusion is omitted as it is straightforward. Take a P-view p in e(σ); e(τ ); there exists an interaction sequence u ∈ ISeq(e(σ), e(τ )) such that
• P-moves in u ↾ (A ′ , B ′ , b) and u ↾ (B ′ , C ′ ) satisfy Persistence since each such move is determined by either the strategy σ or τ .
•
satisfy Persistence since these are P-moves when viewed in the other projection.
It follows that u ↾ (B ′ , C ′ ) ∈ τ and u ↾ (A ′ , B ′ , b) ∈ σ and so p ∈ σ; τ , and hence, we have p ∈ e(σ; τ ) as desired. PROOF. By adapting a standard method in [Bar84] and as a corollary of an approximation theorem.
For any λ-term s, if the set { i ≥ 0 : ∃t.λβ ⊢ s = λx 1 · · · x i .t } has no supremum in N, we say that s has order infinity; otherwise if the supremum is n, we say that s has order n. A term that has order infinity is unsolvable (e.g. yk, for any fixpoint combinator y).
Structure of P-views
We aim to describe P-views of D in terms of blocks (of moves) of two kinds, called α and β respectively.
For n ≥ 0, an α n -block is an alternating sequence of O-questions and Panswers of length 2n+1, beginning with an O-question, such that each element except the first is explicitly justified by the preceding element, as follows: m -block is an alternating sequence of P-questions and O-answers of length 2m + 1, beginning with a P-question, such that each element except the first is explicitly justified by the preceding element, as follows: mblock followed by a ), which is explicitly justified by the last question ( m . An α-block is just an α n -block, for some n; similarly for a β-block.
Suppose we have a P-view of the form
where each A k is an α n k -block and each B k is a β
The superscript (i k , j k ) encodes the fact that the 0-th question of the block B k is explicitly justified by the j k -th question of the block A k−i k . Thus we have the following constraints: for each k ≥ 1
The lower bound of j k is 1 rather than 0 because, by definition of D (see Figure 1 ), the only move that the 0-th question of any α-block can justify is an answer. Note that since p is a P-view by assumption, for each k ≥ 2, the 0-th question of the α-block A k is explicitly justified by the last question of the preceding β-block.
Remark 14
It is straightforward to see that given any finite alternating sequence γ of α-and β-blocks
subject to the constraints (2), there is exactly one P-view p of D that has the shape γ. Therefore there is no harm in referring to the P-view p simply as γ, and we shall do so in the following.
Lemma 15 (P-view Characterization) Suppose, for some m ≥ 0, the evenlength P-view
is in a relevant CC strategy σ over D. Then exactly one of the following holds:
(1) For each j ≥ 0, W α j ∈ dom(f σ ).
(2) There is some n ≥ 0 such that W α n ∈ σ \ dom(f σ ).
(3) There are some n m+1 ≥ 0, some 0 ≤ i ≤ m and some 1 ≤ j ≤ n m+1−i such that f σ : W α n m+1 → ( (i,j) ; further by Relevance, for some l ≥ 0, we have
Moreover by CC we have W α n m+1 β (i,j) l ] C ∈ dom(f σ ), for each (oddlength) copycat block C, as defined in Lemma 6.
PROOF. Suppose for some m ≥ 0, the even-length W ∈ σ. Then W [, where [ is explicitly justified by the last P-question, is a P-view in σ. Clearly if neither (1) nor (2) above holds, then there is some n m+1 ≥ 0 such that f σ maps W α n m+1 to a P-question which (because the current P-view has no pending O-answer) is explicitly justified by an O-question that is currently P-visible i.e. by one of the O-questions (except the 0-th) in one of the m + 1 preceding α-blocks. Formally we have f σ : W α n m+1 → ( (i,j) where 0 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ n m+1−i as required. The rest of (3) above follows immediately from Relevance and by Lemma 6 respectively.
Lemma 16
The denotation of any closed term in D is a compact innocent strategy if and only if it is unsolvable of a finite order.
PROOF. It suffices to prove that
(1) unsolvables of infinite order (2) solvable terms are denoted by non-compact strategies. For the first, note that every finitelength legal position consisting of alternating questions and answers, such that all of which are at level 0, is in the denotation of any unsolvable of order infinity. For any solvable term s which has head normal form λx 1 · · · x n .x i t 1 · · · t m (say) where n ≥ 1 and m ≥ 0, we observe that the P-view α n β
The denotation is a CC strategy, by Lemma 6; hence it is not compact.
Levy-Longo trees
We give an informal definition of LT(s), the Levy-Longo tree [Lev75,Lon83] of a λ-term s.
• Suppose s is unsolvable: If s has order infinity then LT(s) is the singleton tree ⊤; if s has order n ≥ 0 then LT(s) is the singleton tree ⊥ n .
• Suppose s = β λx 1 · · · x m .ys 1 · · · s n where m, n ≥ 0. Then LT(s) is the tree:
It is useful to fix a variable-free representation of Levy-Longo trees. We write N = { 0, 1, 2, · · · } and N + = { 1, 2, 3, · · · }. A Levy-Longo pre-tree is a partial function T from the set (N + ) * of occurrences to the following set of labels
(1) dom(T ) is prefix-closed.
(2) Every occurrence that is labelled by any of ⊥ i and ⊤ is maximal in dom(T ).
is a triple, the first component of which is at least j.
(The case of i = m+ 1 corresponds to the head variable at l 1 · · · l m being a free variable.) We say that the pre-tree is closed if
A Levy-Longo tree is the Levy-Longo pre-tree given by LT(s) for some λ-term s. In the following, we shall only consider closed pre-trees and trees.
To illustrate the variable-free representation, consider the following (running) example.
Example 17 Set s = λx 1 x 2 .x 1 ⊥ 1 (λy 1 y 2 y 3 .y 2 (λz.x 1 )) ⊤. The Levy-Longo tree LT(s), as shown in the figure below
is the partial function:
Take LT(s) : 21 → 1, (2, 1), 0 which encodes the label λz.x 1 of the tree at occurrence 21: the first component is the nested depth of the λ-abstraction: in this case it is a 1-deep λ-abstraction (i.e. of order one); the second component (i, j) says that the head variable (x 1 in this case) is a copy of the j-th (in this case, first) variable bound at the occurrence i (in this case, two) levels up; and the third component is the branching factor at the occurrence, which is 0 in this case i.e. the occurrence 21 has 0 children.
and so, we have
. Finally, we must have j k+1 ≤ n k−i k+1 , as the pointer of the 0-th (P-)question of the β-block β
is to the j k+1 -th question of the α-block α n k−i k+1 .
To summarize, we have shown:
Lemma 18 (Correspondence) There is a one-to-one correspondence between relevant CC strategies over D and closed Levy-Longo pre-trees.
Example 19 Take the term s = λx 1 x 2 .x 1 ⊥ 1 (λy 1 y 2 y 3 .y 2 (λz.x 1 )) ⊤ in the preceding example. In the following For each P-view shown above, note that the subscripts in bold give the corresponding occurrence in the Levy-Longo tree, and the label at that occurrence is specified by the (subscripts and the superscript in the) block that is framed. The first, third and fifth P-views define the "boundary" beyond which the copycat response sets in.
Using an argument similar to the proof of [Bar84, Thm 10.1.23], we can show that every recursive closed Levy-Longo pre-tree T is the Levy-Longo tree of some closed λ-term. Thus we have:
Theorem 20 (Universality) (i) The denotation of a closed λ-term s is a recursive, relevant, CC strategy which corresponds to LT(s) in the sense of Lemma 18. (ii) Every recursive, relevant, CC strategy over D is the denotation of a closed λ-term. I.e. for every σ ∈ L rec (1, D) there is some s ∈ Λ o such that
As a consequence, two closed λ-terms have the same denotation in D iff they have the same Levy-Longo tree.
Full abstraction for the Lazy Lambda Calculus
From the Universality Theorem, it is a small step to show that the model is fully abstract for the Lazy Lambda Calculus. Programs of the (pure) Lazy Lambda Calculus [Plo75, AO93] are closed λ-terms, and values are closed abstractions (ranged over by v, v ′ ). The evaluation relation ⇓ is a binary relation over closed λ-terms, defined by induction over the rules: Note that ⊏ ∼ is a rich theory; e.g. we have
λx.x (x⊥ 1 ⊥) ⊥ 1 ≈ λx.x (λy.x⊥ 1 ⊥y) ⊥ 1 where ⊥ is any unsolvable term of order 0 such as (λx.xx)(λx.xx), and ⊥ 1 is any unsolvable term of order 1 (see [AO93, p. 226 ] for a proof).
Set 2 to be 1 ⊥ . We write ⊤ : 1 −→ 2 for the convergent strategy (i.e. P responds to the opening question with the only answer). For any σ, τ : A −→ B in L rec , we define σ τ to mean for every f : 1 −→ A and every g : B −→ 2 in L rec , if f ; σ ; g = ⊤ then f ; τ ; g = ⊤. (This can be seen as the preorder generated by a notion of observables in the sense of [HO00] .) For any L rec -map ρ : 1 −→ D, we write ρ⇓ to mean that ρ is convergent. Take λ-terms s and t such that Γ = { y 1 , · · · , y m } is the set of variables that occur free in either s or t. Using (2) Theorem 23 (Full Abstraction) For any λ-terms s and t such that Γ is the set of variables that occur free in either s or t, we have
